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COMMENTS
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY IN INDIANA
I. THE STATE
Like many other of our legal concepts, the doctrine of im-
munity of the state from suit was inherited from the English
law. This doctrine found popular expression in the maxim
that "The King can do no wrong," and seems to have its roots
in feudalism and political theories of the Middle Ages,1 when
the theory of the "divine right of kings" was in full bloom.
Government was regarded as a divine institution; therefore,
the sovereign held its position by divine right and was su-
perior to man-made law.
From this background then, our modern law adheres to
the notion that the state is not answerable in damages for
the wrongs committed by its officers and agents. It might
be thought that the analogy has no protraction beyond the
spheres of national government; nevertheless it is generally
accepted that an individual state cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent.2 Apparently the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity was accepted without the recognition of any
necessity for explanation.3
The Indiana Constitution, Article 4, Section 24, author-
izes provision by general act for the bringing of suit against
the state. This section of the Constitution prohibits a special
act which authorizes such suit or which makes compensation
to any person claiming damages against the state. The Gen-
eral Assembly in 1899 passed a general act under the author-
1. Pollack and Maitland, 1 "History of English Law" 518 (2d ed.
1923).
2. Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337 (1879).
3. Watkins, "The State as a Party Litigant" 55 (1927). In Kawa-
nanakon v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Mr. Justice
Holmes stated the reason for this exemption: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or ob-
solete theory, but on the loical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends." It might be argued that the sovereigndoes not make much of our tort law since it has its origin in com-
mon law, but rather that the sovereign only enforces such law.
However it is not the province of this comment to quarrel with
the philosophical acceptability of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. For an exhaustive criticism, see Borchard, "Government
Liability in Tort" 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); 36 Yale
L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927).
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ity of this provision.- The statute provides for suit against
the state on money demands arising out of contracts, express
or implied; but it is inapplicable to tort actions.5 This statute
is the only one existent providing for suability of the state.
The conclusion is that the state itself is not liable for its torts
in the absence of a statute expressly waiving immunity. In-
creased governmental activity by states has made more acute
the problems raised by governmental immunity. Because
the state has been coming in contact with more and more of
the affairs of everyone, damages to person and property by
the state's agents have tended to increase proportionately.
The ever increasing number of citizens using state highways,
working in government buildings, and attending state educa-
tional institutions can receive no recompense if they have the
misfortune to be injured by the state in its capacity as care-
taker, landlord or owner. There is no reason why the state
should not be held to a standard of due care in its operations.
It is more just for the state, through its taxing powers, to
distribute the risk of injury than it is for the individual in-
jured citizen to bear the burden himself. Further, the state
today has taken over many functions which once had belonged
to the private enterpriser, and so the citizen now is without a
remedy which he once had against the private individual.
American political thought long ago repudiated the doctrine
that government can act with impunity in dealing with its
citizens; still the antiquated notions of non-liability linger on.
Legal scholars believe it is high time that the outmoded
doctrine be abolished.,
In recent years, there has been some statutory encroach-
ment on the doctrine of non-liability of the state. A 1941
Act7 empowers the state to purchase policies of insurance in-
suring servants or employees of the state against liability
arising out of the use of any motor vehicle owned or operated
by the state. The policy must contain a provision that the
insurance company will not set up as a defense the immunity
of the state. Previous to this enactment the State Board of
Accounts refused to approve expenditures from public funds
4. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §4-1501.
5. State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213 (1910);
Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. State, 85 Ind.App. 557, 155 N.E. 50(1927).
6. See Borchard, supra n.3.
7. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl., 1940) §39-1819.Q
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for liablity insurance, for the assigned reason that the state
was not liable for its torts., While the statute cannot be
implied to have waived the immunity of the state since serv-
ants and employees rather than the state itself are insured,
it indicates that the legislature, if not the courts, realizes
the injustice worked on injured citizens where the state is in-
volved. The Insurance Statute also provides, however, that
in no event shall the state be liable in any amount in excess
of the maximum amount of valid insurance in full force and
covering themotor vehicle involved in the accident causing the
loss or damage.
II. THE COUNTIES
Once again the theory of liability of quasi-municipal cor-
porations-counties, townships, and school districts-stems
from the English law. Thus the touchstone for the early
American cases was Russell v. Men of Devon.9 The Court
of King's Bench decided that an unincorporated county was
not responsible for injury caused to an individual by a de-
fective bridge, because damages could not be recovered
against the inhabitants in their individual capacity, and there
was no corporation fund out of which satisfaction could be
made. The Massachusetts court applied this reasoning to a
town in Mowrer v. Leicester10 and the decision became a lead-
ing case.
Nevertheless, in a case of first impression in Indiana in
1878, House v. Montgomery County,1 the court reviewed the
historical precedents and came to the conclusion that the de-
fendant county was liable for failure to keep a bridge in
repair as a result of which the plaintiff's mule was injured in
crossing the bridge. The court reasoned that the obligation
8. Letter from C. E. Ruston, State Board of Accounts, to Indiana
Law Journal, March 25, 1948.
9. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
10. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). The court refused to accede to the plain-
tiff's argument that none of the reasons advanced in the English
case was logically applicable. Here the town was a corporation
capable of being sued, the town was expressly bound by statute
to keep the road in repair, and there was a treasury out of which
the judgment could be recovered. Instead, the Massachusetts
court held that quasi-corporations are not liable to an action for
neglect unless the cause of action be specifically given by some
statute.
11. 60 Ind. 580 (1878).
[Vol. 23
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imposed by statute12 to keep bridges in repair, with ample
power to provide means to discharge the obligation, carried
with it a corresponding right in persons using the bridge
to have the obligation fulfilled. The court convincingly point-
ed out that the reasons assigned for non-liability in the early
English cases were not applicable here.13 Within a few years,
however, the court began to drain the case of its vitality.
Thus when a plaintiff sued a county for injuries occurring
by reason of planks sticking upright in a bridge and frighten-
ing his horses, it was held that the county was not liable be-
cause the duty to keep the bridge in repair extended only to
travelers on the bridge, and in fact the horses were frightened
before they were on the bridge structure.14 The court held
that actual physical contact with the defective bridge was
essential to liability. Finally in Jasper County v. Alleman,15
the early Indiana case was overruled as a departure, and the
law is settled that a county is not liable to suit in regard to
bridges and highways. Therefore in spite of statutes placing
a duty of repair and maintenance on a county, there can be
no recovery for injuries caused by violation of the duty
because such statutes do not specifically create liability.
A plaintiff suing the county for an injury where a
public building is concerned meets the same fate, for a county
is not liable for personal injuries caused by negligence of its
Board of Commissioners in the care and control of public
buildings.6 There is, however, one exception. It seems that
quasi-municipal corporations are liable in damages for nui-
sances created by them. Thus, in Haag v. Vanderburgh Coun-
12. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §26-620.
13. Supra n.10.
14. Fulton County v. Rickel, 106 Ind. 501, 7 N.E. 220 (1886). See also
Abbett v. Johnson County, 114 Ind. 61, 16 N.E. 127 (1888) where
it was held that in the absence of a statute imposing the duty upon
counties in express terms and authorizing county boards to raise
and appropriate funds for keeping highways in repair, a county is
not responsible for negligence of those charged with care of public
highways.
15. 142 Ind. 573 (1895). Accord, McDermott v. Delaware County,
60 Ind.App. 209, 110 N.E. 237 (1915).
16. Vigo County v. Daily, 132 Ind. 73, 31 N.E. 531 (1892). The court
admitted there was no distinction between the cases of public
buildings and the early bridge cases finding liability, but it flatly
stated that rule could not be extended. Accord, McDermott v. Del-
aware County, 60 Ind.App. 209, 110 N.E. 237 (1915).
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ty,'1 the defendant county was held liable for injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff by reason of the maintenance of a
pest-house near a dwelling house. The court compared the
liability of a county to that of a municipal corporation and
made no mention of the doctrine that a county is but an arm
of the state and hence immune. Why there is magic in the
idea of a nuisance begetting liability while other torts go un-
redressed is far from clear. The danger in the maintenance
of a pest-house which may subject the plaintiff to contagious
diseases and impair lhis health does not seem basically dif-
ferent from the danger in maintaining a bridge in a defective
condition which may impair the plaintiff's safety.
Of course where statutes give a cause of action and
thereby waive the common law immunity of the county, dif-
ferent inquiries arise. Hence, the familiar rule of narrow con-
struction of a statute in derogation of the common law was
used by the court in denying recovery to a plaintiff'8 suing
under a mob-violence enactment.' 9 The Court construed the
statute to authorize recovery from the county only when the
mob offered violence because of a supposed violation of the
law. Since the violence was an outgrowth of private dis-
agreements in a labor dispute and no law was supposed vio-
lated, the plaintiff was held not to have brought himself
within the enactment, even though the literal terms of the
statute were broad enough to provide a remedy against the
county. It is believed that the narrow construction was justi-
fied since it could not have been the intent of the legislature
to make the county an insurer against all violent action by
groups of persons where the county officials have no op-
portunity to prevent the violence.
A variety of reasons are assigned for the doctrine of ir-
responsibility of the county. "A county is said to be a quasi-
corporation with corporate capacity for specific ends; being
involuntary in that its creation is without the .. .concur-
rence of the inhabitants, .but by the sovereign power
17. 60 Ind. 511 (1878); Pritchett v. Knox County, 42 Ind.App. 3, 85
N.E. 32 (1908). Cf. Greene County v. Usrey, 221 Ind. 197, 46
N.E.2d 823 (1943).
18. Shake v. Sullivan County, 210 Ind. 61, 1 N.E.2d 132 (1935).
19. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §10-3301, providing for liability
of a county for injury resulting from 1nc_ing or mob violence.
472 [Vol. 23
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of the state for governmental purposes. ' '20 Counties
are therefore different from cities which have some
of the attributes of voluntary corporations. Thus a
faulty exercise of the police power resulting in injury
is damnum absque injuria.21 And the rule respondeat
superior does not apply to a county,22 nor is the county
liable for acts of her Board of Commissioners wholly out-
side of powers conferred upon such boards by law.23 The
Indiana court then has adopted the reasoning of the early
American cases, particularly of Massachusetts, and has
grounded the results reached on vague ideas of necessity in
preserving untrammeled the governmental functions of the
county.2- Just how the exception of liability of the county
for maintaining a nuisance can be explained is not clear
unless it is attributed to judicial whim. In any case, it is
apparent that any change in the law in this area must come
through statutorily imposed liability. The courts are too en-
meshed in the doctrines of immunity to extricate themselves
or even to refrain from extending the present rules. 5
III. TOWNSHIPS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
By analogy to the decisions that the state and counties
are not responsible for the torts of their officers and agents,
it has become the accepted rule that townships likewise en-
joy immunity. In Yeager v. Tippecanoe Township,26 the first
Indiana case concerning tort liability of a township, it was
held that this subdivision of the state was not liable for an
20. McDermott v. Delaware County, 60 Ind.App. 209, 212, 110 N.E. 237(1915). In holding that the county was not liable for negligently
failing to keep the court house steps free of ice and snow and
in. repair, the court added that the members of the Board of Com-
nissioners were likewise not liable. Their liability must come
as individuals and here in an act of nonfeasance they acted
as a Board and not as individuals.
21. Greene County v. Usrey, 221 Ind. 197, 46 N.E.2d 823 (1943). See
also Jay County v. DeHoff, 113 Ind.App. 530, 49 N.E.2d 391 (1943).
22. Summers v. Daviess County, 103 Ind. 262, 2 N.E. 725 (1885). See
also Smith v. Gary, 93 Ind.App. 677, 177 N.E. 364 (1931).
23. Fountain County v. Warren County, 128 Ind. 301, 27 N.E. 133(1890); Browing v. Owen County, 44 Ind. 11 (1873).
24. White v. Sullivan County, 129 Ind. 396, 28 N.E. 846 (1891);
McDermott v. Delaware County, 60 Ind.App. 209, 212, 110 N.E. 237(1915).
25. Jay County v. DeHoff, 113 Ind.App. 530, 49 N.E.2d 391 (1943).
26. 81 Ind. 46 (1881); Hamilton County v. Noblesville Township, 4
Ind.App. 145, 30 N.E. 155 (1892).
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injury caused by an obstruction on a public highway. The
Court reasoned that the decisions in Indiana holding cities
liable for defects in streets and alleys and counties liable for
disrepair of bridges were based upon a principle of obligation
to discharge a duty. Since there was not sich a duty imposed
on the township to keep the public highways in repair, there
could be no liability. Subsequent cases have expanded the
original doctrine so that when a duty is imposed on a town-
ship to make road repairs and the township trustee fails to
do so, the maxim respondeat superior does not operate to ren-
der the township responsible.27
Similarly, the courts regard school corporations in this
state as involuntary corporations organized solely for the
public benefit and as agents of the state. A further rationale
is offered in that school districts have no fund out of which
damages can be paid nor do they have authority to raise such
a fund.2 In addition, a trustee of a township in charge of
school buildings who exercises poor judgment in selecting
plans for a school building is not liable for injuries resulting
therefrom. He is acting in an official capacity, not as an
individual, and the immunity of the school district clothes him
with cognate irresponsibility.29
The same statute" which authorizes the State to purchase
insurance against liability of servants and agents of the State.
authorizes purchase by counties, school corporations, and
townships. Here again the statute probably cannot be con-
strued to have waived the immunity of the various sub-
divisions of the State since the instrumentalities themselves
are not insured against liability.
27. Shelby County v. Blair, 8 Ind.App. 579, 35 N.E. 1030 (1893) ; Union
Civil Township v. Berryman, 3 Ind.App. 344, 28 N.E. 774 (1891).
Cf. Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Iddings, 28 Ind. App. 514, 62 N.E. 112(1901).
28. Freel v. School City of Crawfordsville, 142 Ind. 27, 41 N.E. 312(1895); Forrester v. Somerlott, 88 Ind.App. 61, 163 N.E. 121(1928). Cf. Yelch v. Trustees of Purdue University, 210 Ind. 538, 1
N.E.2d 1009 (1936) decided under a statute later repealed. See
also Vernill v. School City of Hobart, 222 Ind. 216, 52 N.E.2d 619(1944).





The liability of municipalities, cities, and towns is filled
with confusion and plagued with gossamer distinctions. Vari-
ous explanations have been offered for the lack of symmetry;81
most likely it is due to the courts' frying to avoid the harsh-
ness of the doctrine that the "King can do no wrong."
Indeed the historical precedent of non-liability of the
municipal corporation is subject to criticism. As pointed out
above32 the first American case of Mowrer v. Leicester3 fol-
lowed closely the reasoning of the English court in Russell v.
Men of Devon" although in the English case a county was
involved which had no fund out of which to pay a judgment.
In the American case a town was involved which is not con-
sidered an involuntary corporation created only for govern-
mental purposes as is the case where counties are concerned.
However, the early Indiana cases found the Massachusetts
doctrine acceptable.35
Generally speaking, the Indiana cases require affirmative
answers to all of the following inquiries in order to fix lia-
bility on a municipal corporation charged with a tort:
1. Was the duty violated connected with a private or
corporate function as distinguished from a governmental
duty?
2. Was the negligent person a servant or agent or em-
ployee of the municipality?
3. Was the act giving rise to the tort committed within
the scope of authorized corporate powers of the municipality,
i.e., not ultra vires?
4. Was the offending servant or employee acting within
the scope of his authority? If not, was the act of the em-
ployee later ratified by the municipality?
5. Was the municipality guilty of negligence and was
the plaintiff free from contributory negligence? In other
words, does application of ordinary tort principles render the
municipality responsible?
31. See, e.g., Chattin, "Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in
Indiana" 10 Ind. L. J. 329, 342 (1935) where the writer suggests
that a balancing of the interests in each case has been the deter-
minative factor.
32. Supra n.10.
33. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
34. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
35. Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17 (1866); Ross v. City
of Madison, 1 Ind. 281 (1848).
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The Indiana Courts have applied these rules with vary-
ing elasticity, apparently seeking to alleviate the harshness of
non-liability for governmental acts but there has been no
definite trend away from the fiat of non-liability in Indiana."
In connection with the first inquiry of whether the func-
tion performed was corporate or governmental, serious ob-
jection is warranted. The judicial rationale for immunity
in the performance of governmental functions is that when
a city or town is acting in such capacity, it is but an arm
of the sovereign state. Since the state is not subject to suit,
the city as its appendage is likewise immune. The answer
to this is that a state enjoys immunity because of a lack of
remedy against it since the state is not subject to jurisdiction
of its courts unless, it consents to suit.3 7 But a city or town
is not in the same position. Courts have jurisdiction over
these instrumentalities and no statutory consent to suit is
required.38
A related justification is that in the pursuit of govern-
mental functions, the municipal agents or employees are act-
ing as agents of the immune state. Under this view, the
Sule of respondeat superior does not apply to impose liability
on the municipal corporation. The principal or master is
found to be the State which is immune from suit. But the
critics"' point out that this is a departure from usual agency
rules of law in that the fact of agency relationship is not
normally determined by the character of the service or func-
tion in which the tort was committed, but rather by the con-
trol and direction exercised over the agent or employee. The
36. There have been attempts to break away from the rule of im-
munity in other states. Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150(1924); Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922);
Cone v. Detroit, 191 Mich. 198, 157 N.W. 417 (1916); Augustine v.
Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732 (1928); City of Paw-
huska v. Black, 117 Okla. 108, 244 Pac. 1114 (1926); Young v.
Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 212 N.W. 295 (1927). In Fowler v.
Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), a distinction was
made between injuries inflicted by a fire department on the way
to a fire (governmental function) and those occurring on a return
trip. It was decided that the rule of inmunity did not apply on the
return trip. However, this step toward increased liability was
quickly retraced and Ohio is now back in line. Aldrich v. Youngs-
town, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
37. Supra n.2.
38. Harno, "Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations" 4 Ill. L. Q. 28(1921).
39. Id. at 34. See also Borchard, "Governmental Liability in Tort"
34 Yale L. J. 129 (1925).
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direction and control is almost always centered in the muni-
cipal corporation and not in the State and normal application
of the rules of agency would disclose the city as principal or
master.
Another position frequently taken by the courts is that
immunity for governmental functions is necessary to prevent
diversion of public funds to private or unauthorized purpoges.
A variant of this explanation is that unless there is immunity
in some functions the municipal corporation could not prop-
erly perform all its functions and would hesitate to assume
new activities, because of the fear of being held liable for
negligent performance of these activities. Once again, the
commentators are critical and believe such a stand as this is
a philosophy of risk allocation contrary to that which inspired
the Workmen's Compensation laws and other social legis-
lation.40
The distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions is difficult of application. As new and wider var-
iety of municipal functions has developed, no satisfactory
or logical test for classification has been evolved. 41 Strange
indeed is a rule that allows recovery when a person is struck
by a truck used by the municipal lighting plant but denies re-
covery when struck by a police car. Or, more strikingly, an
injury resulting from negligence in failing to maintain a
water pipe connection may be compensable but not so if an
unrepaired fire hose is the cause of injury.42
40. Rosenfield, "Governmental Immunity from Liability for Torts in
School Accidents" 5 Legal Notes on Local Gov't 358 (1940); Fuller
and Casner, "Municipal Tort Liability in Operation" 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 437 (1941).
41. Seasongood, "Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Govern-
mental or Proprietary Test" 22 Va. L. Rev. 910 (1936).
"While the distinction between public and private functions
as affecting liability for negligence . . . is generally recognized,
a great deal of confusion arises when attempt is made to deter-
mine in what capacity the municipality was acting in committing
the particular tort complained of." Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18,
23, 112 N.E. 994 (1916). Here the plaintiff was injured while
attempting to unload a cannon under the direction of an agent of
the defendant city. The court reasoned that the city, as a cor-
poration, acquires an individuality distinct from the sovereign
power of the state and therefore the city could be found liable.
The control by the city over its parks was rather arbitrarily com-
pared with a city's power over streets where liability has been
sustained.
42.' Aschoff v. Evansville, 34 Ind.App. 25, 72 N.E. 279 (1904). The
plaintiff's cellar was flooded by a bursting water pipe connnection
when firemen were fighting a fire. The court found negligence in
19481
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One of the traditional tests has been to determine whe-
ther the function out of which the tort arose was one from
which the municipality derived pecuniary compensation or
profit. If so, the municipality is said to have acted in a
proprietary manner; but if the function is one of the duties
imposed on the municipality by the state, the city is said
to have acted in a governmental capacity. The criticism is
that in other situations where tort law is applied, the presence
or absence of pecuniary profit of the tort-feasor is not a de-
terminative factor.
The local benefit test has also been utilized by the courts
in arriving at the choice between governmental and proprie-
tary functions. That is, if the function inures to the advan-
tage of the public generally, it is governmental; if the benefit
is peculiarly to the municipal community, it is a proprietary
function. But realistically the fact is that all municipal
functions are for the public benefit, otherwise they could
not be financed with public funds and any benefit to a partic-
ular locality is also a benefit to the state. The inconsist-
ency of this doctrine is seen in cases involving the functions
of police and fire departments, which certainly are of at least
immediate benefit to the municipality but the strength of
historical precedent is felt by the court and there is vir-
tually complete unanimity in classifying police and fire de-
partments as governmental functions and the following de-
termination of non-liability. 43 The furnishing of utilities falls
into the proprietary classification-the profit or local benefit
being stressed-and the municipal supplier is not immune
from suit. When the municipality is charged with negligence
failing to keep the water system in repair and that the water sys-
tem was proprietary in nature. However, the court added that
had the fire hose broken, recovery would have been denied be-
cause the hose was part of a governmental function of the city,
and not part of the waterworks.
Also it is stated that a city is under no legal duty to light
its streets. But its failure to do so may be considered in deter-
mining negligence in permitting an obstruction at a given point.
Shreve v. Fort Wayne, 176 Ind. 347, 96 N.E. 7 (1911); East Chi-
cago v. Gilbert, 59 Ind.App. 613, 108 N.E. 29 (1915). And an
early case finds the city liable for installation of a sewer "of such
incapacity that every sane man knows in advance that it will not
afford any relief.... " Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235 (1868).
But Rozell v. Anderson, 91 Ind. 591 (1883) decides that a city can-
not be held liable for errors of judgment concerning capacity of a
sewer. Cf. North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2 N.E. 821(1885).
43. Indianapolis v. Butzke, 217 Ind. 203, 26 N.E.2d 754 (1940).
[Vol. 23
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
concerning streets, sidewalks, and bridges, generally im-
munity is denied in Indiana. In regard to construction and
maintenance of sewers and drains, the Indiana courts with
but a few deviations hold the municipality to liability when
duetcare is not exercised. Likewise there can be liability in
cases involving parks, swimming pools and places of rec-
reation. But in school accident cases, education is called
a governmental function and liability is denied. The same
result is reached in regard to public buildings such as hos-
pitals and court houses.4"
The second inquiry concerns the agency relationship
when a municipality is sued for injuries inflicted by its al-
leged servants or employees. If the negligent employee is
regarded as a servant of the state, then of course the liability
of the municipality is precluded. However, the rationale
usually proceeds on a different tack. Since the usual tests of
whether the municipality had control of the employee, whe-
ther the municipality could direct the work being done, and
whether the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment,4 would generally result in a determination that
the municipality was the employer, the courts fall back on
the ground of character of the function involved.46  Thus
even if the injured person can establish that the negligent
actor was in fact and law employed by the municipality, was
subject to the control and direction of the city, and was act-
ing within the scope of his authority, his cause of action may
be defeated by the doctrine of dual capacity of the munic-
ipality.
The rule commonly known as ultra ires, that there is no
corporate liability when the act complained of is outside of the
44. Many of the cases arising under the various activities are cited
in Chattin, "Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Indiana"
10 Ind. L. J. 329 (1935).
45. 6 McQuillan, "Municipal Corporations" (2d ed. 1937) §2824.
46. Michigan City v. Werner, 186 Ind. 149, 114 N.E. 636 (1916);
Wayne v. Curtis, 73 Ind.App. 640, 126 N.E. 699 (1920). The last
cited case, after reciting the familiar and automatic rule of non-
liability of the municipality for negligence of its officers in en-
forcing police regulations, proceeds to define "police power" as ex-
tending to all matters affecting the peace, health, order, morals,
convenience, comfort, and safety of the public. Under such a
broad definition, it is hard to envisage what phase of ordinary ac-
tivity of the municipal officers is not included in the immunity
under police powers. Cf. Indianapolis v. Cauley, 164 Ind. 304, 73




character of some valid legislative enactment applicable to
it, is adhered to in Indiana47 However, few Indiana cases
have considered ultra vires as a ground for non-liability. The
reason may be that non-responsibility can be grounded on the
before mentioned theories of the actor being a servant of the
state or the broader ground of immunity of the municipality
in performance of governmental duties. Nevertheless, ultra
vires remains in the background of the judicial thinking of
the courts when a municipality is charged with negligence.48
The inquiry of whether the employee was acting within
the scope of his authority when an injury occurred is of
course related to the problem of the general aspects of master
and servant law. Thus the municipal employer is held blame-
less for an officer's unlawful arrest of a citizen since the
officer is said to be "acting" for the public and is not an agent
of the city4 9 even though the officer admittedly is paid from
the corporate coffers. Moreover, the doctrine of ratification
seems to find little application in Indiana. When the corpor-
ate officers exceeded the authority of the city of Huntington
and graded a road outside the corporate limits, the city was
found not liable for an injury caused by material left near
the road by the workmen.50 The continued use and main-
tenance of the road apparently did not constitute ratification
of the originally extra-legal act.
Leaving aside the confusion resulting from application
of the rules of classification of function, the usual aspects of
normal tort law must be considered by the court in determin-
ing the liability of the city. Negligence cannot be imputed
to the city if the act or omission of the agent or employee did
not violate a duty owed to the plaintiff. Of course, the neg-
ligent act must have been the proximate cause of the result-
ing harm. And, as in normal tort cases, contributory neg-
ligence bars the possible recovery of the plaintiff.51
47. Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372 (1885) ; Shelby County v. Deprez,
87 Ind. 512 (1882); Shelby County v. Castetter, 7 Ind.App. 309,
34 N.E. 687 (1893).
48. Huntington v. Thomas, 86 Ind.App. 401, 157 N.E. 286 (1927).
49. Laurel v. Blue, t Ind.App. 128, 27 N.E. 301 (1891). Nor can a
patient of a city hospital maintain an action against the city for
damages for alleged malpractice of a hospital physician. Williams
v. Indianapolis, 26 Ind.App. 630, 59 N.E. 941 (1901). Accord,
Watts v. Princeton, 49 Ind.App. 35, 96 N.E. 658 (1911).
50. Huntington v. Thomas, 86 Ind.App. 401, 157 N.E. 286 (1927).
51. Harper, "Torts" (1933) §4.
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In the cases where the courts are disposed to find that
a governmental function is involved and hence that the munic-
ipality is not liable for its action, inquiry into the ordinary
tort principles, above noted, is generally forestalled. Yet
ordinary tort principles might well deny liability of the city
when so-called governmental functions are involved. Anal-
ysis of a few cases may better illustrate this. In Wheeler V.
Plymouth52 the defendant city gave permission to persons to
fire gunpowder within the corporate limits. Damage to prop-
erty of the plaintiff resulted from the negligence of the li-
censees and the city was held not liable. It seems doubtful
if an individual, not clothed with immunity, could be found
responsible in such a case unless he were negligent in giving
permission, for to hold otherwise would make him an insurer
of the licensee's action. And in the case arising out of a fire
department vehicle accident, 53 the reviewing court did not con-
sider the evidence at all as to the possibility of plaintiff having
been guilty of contributory negligence, but simply stated the
rule of governmental immunity to preclude recovery. In an-
other case, the city of Anderson was held not to be liable when
the wall of a burned-out private building extending partly into
a public alley collapsed on the plaintiff's building.- Although
the ground of decision in the case was confused, it would seem
difficult on ordinary tort principles to find that the city owed
a duty to the plaintiff. Liability was precluded in another
casess where a railroad company, granted a right of way by
the city, constructed an insufficient culvert over a river.
Although the court found no liability on the ground that the
city received no benefit and hence was not acting in a pro-
prietary capacity, even applying general tort principles it
would seem harsh to impute the act of the railroad company
to the city.
On the other hand, Michigan City v. Werner-s illustrates
that where the question is adjudicated according to usual
tort concepts, the city will not always be found liable. In that
case, the plaintiff jumped off a bridge which had been neg-
52. 116 Ind. 158, 18 N.E. 532 (1888). Accord, Mt. Vernon v. Alldridge,
74 Ind.App. 309, 128 N.E. 934 (1920). Cf. Michigan City v.
Boeckling, 122 Ind. 39, 23 N.E. 518 (1889).
53. Indianapolis v. Butzke, 217 Ind. 203, 26 N.E.2d 754 (1940).
54. Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126, 19 N.E. 726 (1889).
55. Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17 (1866).
56. 186 Ind. 149, 115 N.E. 636 (1916).
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ligently raised by a servant of the city. The upper court
remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence. In another case,5 7 the defendant city
through its agents opened a ditch alongside the plaintiff's
Way from which noisome odors arose. After assuming that
the city was entitled to a presumption that it would soon
remedy the situation, the court finally grounded the decision
of non-liability on the city's reasonable, careful acting under
the circumstances.
Thus it appears that the ratio decidendi of municipal im-
munity is not completely warranted. The courts voice ob-
jections to holding municipalities accountable to the same
extent as individuals because of the fear that corporate funds
would be exhausted by suits brought by injured persons, and
because of the feeling that the city would retreat into a shell
of inaction for fear of being rendered responsible for neg-
ligent performance of corporate functions. But it is believed
that the danger is overestimated-municipalities are not held
to a greater degree of carefulness than other corporations or
individuals.
In view of the inequities arising under court handling
of municipal liability, legislative action seems to be the most
feasible remedy for the situation. A 1945 Act 58 takes a long
step toward stabilizing the law of municipal tort liability.
The Act provides for liability of the municipality when in-
jury to a person or property is caused by negligent operation
of a motor vehicle owned by a municipal corporation and oper-
ated by a member of the police or fire departments in per-
formance of his duties as such a member. In one instance
the words "municipal corporation" are used; in another the
designation is "municipality." Townships and counties may
57. Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 (1881). In Roll v. Indianapolis,
52 Ind. 547 (1876), there is further illustration that determination
of non-liability often is based on the character of the function in-
volved when the holding could be grounded on other foundations.
There the city constructed a sewer in front of the plaintiff's shop,
gave him the right to tap it, and assessed him one half the cost.
The plaintiff sued when his basement was flooded due to failure
of the sewer. The city was held guiltless for judicial errors in
its ordaining powers; but the plaintiff had exceeded his right to
tap the sewer by letting in foul material and further, there was
a proviso in the permit whereby any inhabitant tapping a sewer
agreed to save the city harmless. Thus the court preferred to
brush aside the contract and estoppel aspects and rest the decision
on the available grounds of immune governmental action.
58. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Supp., 1945) §48-8001.
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be included in these terms. In other statutes the legislature
has specifically defined "municipal corporation" to include
counties and townships. 9 However, this statute contains no
definition section. In any case, the 1945 Act represents a
salutary and desirable shift in policy and a resultant nar-
rowing of the area of irresponsibility in activities tradition-
ally declared governmental.
The 1941 Act concerning the purchase of insurance,60
discussed above in connection with the state, is also applicable
to the municipal corporation. It provides that in no event
shall the state or municipality be liable in any amount in ex-
cess of the maximum amount of valid insurance in full force
and covering the motor vehicle involved in the accident caus-
ing the loss or damage. Conceivably, although not at all like-
ly, this provision could be used to destroy the liability now
imposed upon a municipality. The municipality apparently
could purchase ridiculously small policies and insulate itself
against liability for a greater amount. In effect, then, the
already constricted areas of liability of municipalities could
be further narrowed by application of the statute to proprie-
tary functions, where municipalities have been held respon-
sible the same as individuals. On the other hand, the statute
might be construed to waive immunity of the municipal-
ities even as to traditionally governmental activities since
prior to its passage expenditures for liability insurance were
disapproved as an improper use of public funds on the ground
that there was no liability of the municipality. However, this
would not give literal interpretation to the words of the
enactment which provide for the insuring of the officers and
employees of the municipality and not the municipality itself.
59. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns RepI., 1940) §39-1820.
60. Ibid.
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